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Our embodied capacity for action and our dispositions towards goals define our
perception of a situation and possible actions. Thus, situations are not constitutive
of action, but they demand that we act. For Shane Ralston, the situations that call
for action are historical, imagined, or projected debates involving John Dewey.
When Dewey is portrayed not just as a presenter of theory, but as an actor in debates grounded in time, place, and daily life consequences, we understand his arguments in new ways. When he is called upon to act by engaging in debates that
arose even long after his death, the interaction (or transaction) of philosopher and
situation produces new meaning.
The non-teleological, creative conception of the relationship between actor
and situation has been developed well by Hans Joas, building upon the work of
George Herbert Mead, Dewey, and other pragmatists. As the actor engages with
changing situations, new meanings emerge. There is thus a quasi-dialogical relationship between action and situation, which implies a creativity of action, neither pre-determined by intentionality nor pre-established by the situation.1 Hubert Dreyfus expresses a similar idea in a passage about falling in love: “In such a
creative discovery the world reveals a new order of signification which is neither
simply discovered nor arbitrarily chosen.”2 The reconstructions of Dewey that we
observe in Ralston’s reconstructed debates are prime examples of what Joas calls the
creativity of action. They are not merely a means to understand a pre-determined
Dewey; they reveal “a new order of signification.”
The debates presented cleverly demonstrate the quasi-dialogical relation
between situation and actor. Instead of being simply another reading of Deweyan
texts, they are an effort to bring Dewey to life, not to “maintain an immune monastic respectability” but to participate actively “in the living struggles and issues” of
the times 3. Of course, Dewey, as much or more than any other major philosopher,
understood philosophy as active participation in life and embodied that in his own
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work. Moreover, growth is a unifying concept linking many aspects of Dewey’s
philosophy. It seems especially fitting for Ralston to ask how Dewey’s ideas themselves would grow in response to new challenges.
Dewey was a consummate debater, not as we might think today of one who
excels at oral debate competitions with assigned positions to defend, but rather as
someone who wrestled with important public policy issues and intellectual discussions of his times, defending positions that were deeply held, but often unpopular.
He engaged with Bertrand Russell on theories of logic,with Walter Lippman on the
role of expertise in public deliberations, with Kenneth Burke and with Randolph
Bourne about democracy and World War I, with Jane Addams regarding violence
in the context of the Pullman strike, and with many others on diverse topics.
One consequence of this wrestling with issues of the day is that Dewey’s ideas
are best understood not as fixed elements within an abstract system. Instead, as
he saw them, they are tools for inquiry situated in the context of active struggles
of the times and his own engagements as a public intellectual. Others have used
reconstructed debates to examine Dewey. For example, Paul Stob reads him as engaging in a postmortem dialogue with Burke. The areas of agreement and points
of contention between Burke and Dewey become both more lively and more comprehensible when presented in the context of concrete historical reality.4 Similarly,
John Capps brings Dewey into dialogue with AIDS activists and creationists, and
Michael Eldridge, the dedicatee of Ralston’s book, does the same with a dispute put
to the grievance committee that Dewey chaired for the New York Teacher’s Union.5
Ralston takes the idea of debate as a medium for understanding much further.
The first two debates he considers are among ones that Dewey actually had with
his contemporaries, one with Leon Trotsky and the second with Robert Hutchins.
Next, he considers two imagined debates with contemporary intellectuals, E. D.
Hirsch and Robert Talisse. Both of these scholars have criticized Dewey’s ideas long
after his death; Ralston helps us to see, or reconstruct, a Deweyan response. In the
latter part of the book, he considers contemporary public policy debates, one on
home schooling versus public schooling and one on George W. Bush’s claim that
terrorists, dictators, and their supporters hate America for its freedom. For the debates involving Trotsky and Hutchins we have documentation for both Dewey and
his opposition. For Hirsch and Talisse, we have only their voices, and must do a
bit more work to project Dewey’s rebuttal. In the final examples, we have circumstances that Dewey did not encounter, so that we must imagine more fully how his
theories might respond, or evolve to respond.
In addition to the six debates that receive the full treatment, there is effectively
another debate in the introduction about historical inquiry. I found this to be one
of the most interesting. Dewey sees history as growing out of present conditions.
Drawing from his view of logic as a theory of inquiry, he writes “We naturally
remember what interests us and because it interests us. The past is recalled not
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because of itself but because of what it adds to the present”6. C. I. Lewis and others
interpreted Dewey’s view as sinking into total relativism, with each historian writing
from his or her own vantage point. Ralston does a nice job of presenting this debate,
and consequently, setting up the rationale for the book’s project of relating Dewey
to present interests.
None of the debates are presented as simple win/lose propositions. In fact,
in each case, except the last one, Ralston searches for the common ground as well
as differences. He also does a good job showing weaknesses in Dewey’s position,
for example, regarding Dewey’s understanding of Marxism in the Trotsky debate.
As a result, the debates are presented in an engaging way, which calls the reader
in to see what Dewey will do next. They fulfill the promise of showing Dewey in a
manner fitting to his philosophy, and revealing more about Dewey’s ideas than we
might glean from a straight reading.
However, the debate format does have some limitations. Fitting six major
debates into 100 pages doesn’t leave much room for developing systems of thought
or accounting for nuances in positions. In the first one (Trotsky), we need to understand Marxism and pragmatism, their contrasting views of history, the resulting
thesis that they are incompatible, Dewey’s misreading of Marxism, and eventually a possible synthesis that can be applied to fair trade activism. Ralston makes a
good effort to do this, but I felt the need for more elaboration on all the positions
presented, perhaps another 100 pages to explore the ways in which Marxism and
pragmatism overlap as well as the ways they do not, not simply going from incompatibility to synthesis.
Another concern about the format is that, despite allowing a few criticisms of
Dewey, it tends to give us one position, then a response from Dewey showing how
that position is wrong. Even for readers sympathetic to Dewey (or Deweyan analysis,
as we should say for the later chapters), the resolution of the debate comes across
as too easy, too complete. In each case, there could be more left unresolved. For
example, Ralston makes the case that Hutchins over-emphasizes subject matter (the
Great Books), and separates subject matter from method. He argues in that chapter
that a richer vision can be found in John A. Rice’s view of the curriculum as a tool
for individual growth. For Rice, as with Dewey, the classic texts were only one means
of getting experience for growth. However, a good case can be made that the Great
Conversation idea inherent in the Great Books approach is a dialogical method
supportive of pragmatist inquiry, despite the heated disagreements between Dewey/
Rice and Hutchins. Thus, method is very present, just not elaborated. Moreover, the
realizations of Hutchins’s ideas in actual curricula have led them to evolve, just as
Dewey’s have. One can find, as Ralston does, that Dewey’s view is ultimately more
comprehensive, more balanced, more open, more coherent, and so on, yet still leave
more room for questions about the role of accumulated cultural knowledge, how
much shared subject matter there should be, or how subject matter and method
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interact within different disciplines. Ralston does articulate five major points of
convergence between Dewey and Hutchins. However, it would be in keeping with
the book’s premise of a living Dewey to ask less for a comfortable resolution and
more for questions for further inquiry.
Attempting to encapsulate Dewey’s work, John McDermott writes that the
philosopher “believed that ordinary experience is seeded with possibilities for surprises and possibilities for enhancement if we but allow it to bathe over us in its own
terms.”7 Ralston does an excellent job springing some of those surprises by taking
the reader through actual, imagined, and projected debates involving Dewey. In so
doing, he reveals how Deweyan engagement fosters an enhanced understanding of
both past and contemporary issues. It is also a “call for Deweyan pragmatists to
engage in historical inquiry. . . . To step back as a way of moving forward, to embrace a more nostalgic from of pragmatism”8. The generative Dewey presented here
is an excellent introduction to Dewey’s political and pedagogical theory as well as
to how that theory emerges from and returns to concrete social reality.
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